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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF Tim
STATE OF UTAH

GERALD E. HULBERT,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No.
16197

-vsTHE STATE OF UTAH,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This action was brought by the respondent Gerald
E. Hulbert to recover attorneys fees in the amount of
$77,275.00 and court costs in the amount of $540.65 from
the appellant State of Utah pursuant to Sections 63-30a-l, 2
and 3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by Chapter 245
of the Laws of Utah, 1977, "'hich became effective May 10,
1977.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOlVER COURT
Following a non-jury trial the lower court granted
judgment for the plaintiff-respondent in the amount of
$62,384.99.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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RELEIF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment
of the lower court on the grounds that i t had no
jurisdiction to entertain the action, the judgment is
not supported by the evidence and the statute upon which
the judgment is based is invalid as private, special or
retroactive legislation under the United State and
Utah Constitutions.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
With some marked exceptions, there is competent
evidence in this case which would support the Findings
of Fact of the court below.

Those findings of fact, with

the exceptions noted, are as follows:
1.

In 1975, a series of indictments were issued

by a Utah State Grand Jury against Gerald Hulbert, the
plaintiff-respondent, containing twelve counts in all which
were issued in connection with and arose out of certain
claimed acts

and/or omissions of Mr. Hulbert during the

performance of his duties and within the scope of his
employment as Chairman and Director of the

Utah State

Liquor Control Commission.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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2.

Ultimately, each of the indictments were

disposed of by a verdict of "not guilty" after trial,
by an acquittal or by a dismissal of the action by the
court.
3.

Mr. Hulbert retained the services of

Wayne L. Black and John L. Black and their law firm of
Rawlings, Roberts and Black to defend himself against the
charges contained in the indictments.
4.

Waype L. Black and John L. Black were lifelong

friends of Mr. Hulbert and no fee arrangement was made
between the parties at the outset of their work on his
behalf.

(It should here be noted that such services

commenced in January of 1974 and included appearances by
John L. Black as Mr. Hulbert's counsel at hearings
conducted by the Salt Lake County Attorney and the Utah
Advisory Council on Liquor Control in October and November
of that year.
5.

R. 138-141, 188-192.)
After the first group of indictments were

issued in May, 1975, a $5,000 retainer was paid to the
Black firm by Mr. Hulbert and an additional fee of $5,000
was estimated for trial of the matter, if necessary, and
$2,000 for an appeal.

(It should be noted that the

retainer, trial fee and appeal fee, if necessary, were
agreed upon by the parties at that time.

See Mr. Hulbert's

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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testimony at R. 143-144, and Wayne L. Black's testimony
at R. 199-200.

It should also be noted that the first

group of indictments included 4 indictments with 7
counts of perjury, false and material statements and
embezzlement of whiskey.

See Mr. Wayne L. Black's

testimony describing same at R. 196.)
6.

A second and third set of indictments

were handed down in July and August of 1975, and the
Blacks continued to represent Mr. Hulbert thereon.
7.

The matter was vigorously prosecuted by

special attorneys general appointed by the State and
Salt Lake County Attorney's office, and the defense
was ?retracted, complicated, time consuming and difficult.
8.

Attendant publicity contributed to the task

of defense counsel.
9.

Mr. Hulbert's mental and physical health

deteriorated during the protracted litigation and any
discussion of fees was deferred, but he finally insisted
on a billing because of his strong sense of personal
and moral obligation to pay for the services rendered
and to know where he stood vis-a-vis the fee obligation.
10.

In response to Mr. Hulbert's request,

Wayne L. Black wrote a letter in September of 1976,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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offering to consider $18,500 the total fee, taking
into account $8,500 paid prior to that date by Hulbert
who, though unemployed and ill, informed Mr. Black
that the fee suggested in the September letter was
token in nature and unacceptable to him.
(Exhibit 4-P is the letter from Mr. Black
to Mr. Hulbert and clearly sets forth the total fee
for all services to be performed on all the indictments
of $18,500.

It is not an "offer" or "suggestion" in

any sense of the word.

Exhibit 5-P is a note from

Hulbert to the Blacks in response to the billing in
which he acknowledges the fee as "very, very minimal"
and states his only concern "is making prompt payment
to you."

Nothing in the written documents indicates

any non-acceptance or repudiation of the stated fee
by either party.)
11.

Subsequently, Mr. Hulbert and counsel

agreed orally that Hulbert would pay the law firm a
reasonable and fair fee "if and when" he became able
to do so.
[The evidence will not support such an agreement.
Hulbert testified that he subsequently told Mr. Black "I
would make it right with him if I could find it in my
means at any time."

(R. 153.)

Wayne Black's testimony

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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on the matter was that Hulbert told him "I don't know
when or how I am going to be able to do it, but I'm not
going to rest until I pay you something that is reasonable and that more nearly represents what you have
done for me and my family," to which Black responded
"Well, Gerry, let's just kind of let it go and see
what happens, and if you are able ever to do that, or
to pay an additional amount, that would be fine
with me, and I will kind of leave it up to you."
217-218).

(R.

On cross examination Mr. Black testified

as follows:
"Q. And wasn't it your intent
in writing the letter that is an
exhibit here, that I think is dated
September the 3rn, that you were
going to satisfy him by setting an
amount beyond which you wouln not
assert any legal claim against him?
A. That's right." (R.322.)
And he further testified as to the subsequent oral
discussion as follows:
"MR. HANSEN:
I'm simply asking
if there has been anything that's
happened since Septenber 3rd upon
which Mr. Black feels that he could
assert a claim for an additional
amount than what is in the letter and
except as it applies based upon that
statute.
A. li'ell, I think--

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Q. In.other words, absent the
legislature doing anything, now that
you have had a chance because Mr.
Hulbert is not in an emotional state
to look at it perhaps under less
friendship duress, to say that you
do have a claim against him?
A. Well, I think that the thing
that happened on September 3rd and the
days that followed was not really a
thing that rose to the level of a new
contract, or any contract at all.
I advised in my letter Mr. Hulbert
of an amount of money that would
satisfy me, having in mind all of
the problems and travails that he was
undergoing at that time. And when
he came back after receiving that
letter and after writing a little
note that he wrote to me and talked
to me about this, he was saying, and
did say to me, I won't accept that
amount of money as being a discharge
of the obligation for what you have
done for me, and I don't know when
or how I will be able to do it, but
I'm going to make this right with
you, Mr. Black, and I'm going to do
what is right, you know. Gerry
never called me "Hr. Black", that
wasn't the words. And I in turn
said, well, whatever you are able to
do, or can do, I will be satisfied with.
If that's interpreted as a new
agreement, the agreement was that he
was going to pay me what was reasonable
and right regardless of the content of
my letter, and I was willing to accept
his analvsis of what was reasonable and
right as- a discharge of that obligation.
Now, that's the way I looked at that."
(R. 324-326).
The fact of the matter is that at the time of trial Mr.
Hulbert had only paid only $11,500 plus two small checks
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amounting to $564.99 for court reporters and transcripts,
of which sum $1,500

was paid for representation on tax

matters not involved in this action.

(R. 153-154, 177-178,

emphasis added.)]
12.

No accounting or itemization of specific

services was prepared by the law firm at that time.

An

itemized record of services was prepared by the law firm
in 1977 for use in support of Mr. Hulbert's claim which
he thereafter submitted to the Utah State Board of ExaMiners.
13.

Mr. Hulbert intended his obligations to be one

for reasonable fees at a then undetermined level, and his
counsel intended that the obligation would be contingent upon
Hulbert's future ability to pay.
(As pointed out above the only obligation Hulbert
incurred was the billing set forth in Exhibit 4-P for $18,500
and his ability to pay has never reached that level as his
total payments on that fee at the tine of trial was only
$10,000.)
14.

In 1977, the Utah State Legislature adopted

Section 63-30a-2, Utah Code Annotated,

(1953), which reads

as follows:
"If a state grand jury indicts an
officer or employee, in connection with
or arising out of any act or omission
of that officer or employee durinq the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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performance of his duties, within
the scope of his employment or under
color of his authority, and that
innictrnent is quashed or dismissed
or results in a judgment of acquittal,
unless the indictment is quashed or
dismissed upon application or motion
of the prosecuting attorney, that
officer or employee shall be entitled
to recover from the state reasonable
attorney's fees and court costs
necessarily incurred in the' defense
of that indictment."
15.

The indictments handed down against Hulbert

were connected \vith the performance of his public duties
within the meaning of the statute.
16.

The efforts of defense counsel in suppressing

illegal or inadmissible evidence \vere totally responsible
for the dismissal of two counts in the indictments (by the
prosecution) and the defense of those two counts was such
an integral part of the entire defense that they cannot be
excluded from this lawsuit.
17.

Hulbert incurred attorneys fees and court

costs and agreed and promised to pay Rawlings, Roberts anq
Black for the fair value of their services.
(This finding of fact is contrary to the actual
obligation between the parties as represented by Exhibits
4-P and 5-P and no subsequent agreement was ever entered
into between the oarties as hereinabove set forth.)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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18.

f.1r. Hulbert and his counsel agreed that

Hulbert would pay reasonable attorneys fees if and when
he obtained the means.
[The evidence does not support any such agreement
between the parties, and the foregoing finding is totally
refuted by respondent's letter dated September 9, 1977
(Exhibit 1-D) to his attorneys in which he confirmed and
stated his prior approval of the agreement to pay $18,500
for his attorneys' services.]
19.

The passage of Section 63-30a-2, Utah Code

Annotated, 1953, by the Utah Legislature was, in fact, the
occurrence of the condition precedent, or contingency,
upon which Hulbert's obligation hinged, and he is now
obligated by his own promise to pay a reasonable fee for
services rendered, and he has "incurred" such a fee
within the meaning of the statute.
(This finding of fact is a conclusion of law by
the lower court and the means by which the lower court
transferred the factually non-existent ability of Hulbert
to pay not only the attorneys' fees he was obligated to
pay as evidenced by Exhibits 4-P and 5-P but also such
additional fees as he would like to have paid to his life1

long friends, the Blacks, onto the shoulders of the
taxpayers of

beleguer~

the State of Utah whose unlimited ability to

pay is hereby conveniently substituted for that of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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respondent Hulbert.

The pertinent facts are that Hulbert

conceived of the idea of a state reimbursement statute,
obtained a draft of the bill through the assistance of his
attorney Wayne L. Black, secured its sponsorship in the
legislature and successfully lobbied it to enactment.
(R. 156-158).
R.

As to the latter Mr. Hulbert testified at

158:
"Q. And was the bill there
ultimately enacted into law?
A. Yes, sir, it was.
I must
confess that I lobbied many, many
days up there with people that I
thought I knew, and it was a personal
effort that I feel succeeded in getting
it passed."

The bill as enacted was made retroactive for two years so
as to cover the indictments in Hulbert's own case.

See

Section 63-30a-2, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by
Chapter 245 of the Laws of Utah 1977.)
20.

Hulbert's exposure was great and the State

hired well-knm.;n and experienced outside counsel to
prosecute the charges against him, which they did in an
effective and agressive fashion, and Hulbert was justified
in his decision to seek not only "adequate" counsel but
the most effective counsel he could.
(This finding of fact as to the effectiveness
of the prosecution would clearly be suspect in light of the
failure of the prosecution to secure a single conviction out
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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of twelve felony counts in the several indictments.

This

is a conclusion of the lower court that is unwarranted
under the evidence in the case.)
21.

The determination of a reasonable fee must

include the many factors ordinarily used by an attorney in
setting a fee himself.
The time spent on the

These include the following:
matter~

(2) The complexity of the case

and difficulty of representation of the
skill, competence and experience of
ability of the client to
between client and

pay~

attorney~

(1)

client~

counsel~

(3) The

(4) The

(5) The personal relationship
(6) The actual outcome of

the case in view of the results possible at the outset.
22.

Counsel for t1r. Hulbert spent 525 hours on

this case and made 65 court appearances.

Two trials and

two appeals were successfully prosecuted and Hulbert was
eventually exonerated on all twelve counts in question
herein, each of which involved felony charges and which
could have resulted in substantial prison terms.
23.

The hourly fees of $75.00 per hour charged

by counsel for Hulbert and the additional fees charged for
court appearances, trials and appeals were within the range
of reasonable fees for the services rendered, and the
total fee, together with costs, claimed here by Hulbert
of $77,275.00 is within the reasonable range.
[In addition to the hourly charges, the total fee
Sponsored
by the S.J.
Law Library.in
Funding
for digitization
providedinclurted
by the Institute of Museum
and Libraryfor
Servicesa
claimed
byQuinney
Hulbert
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jurY

trial from October 14-21, 1975, $7,500 for a non-'jury trial
from DeceMber 2-5, 1975, and $200 for court appearances other
than trials and appeals (R.

30~·)

There is no evidence in the

record of this case that Mr. Black ever "charged" Hulbert
$75 per hour in addition to the claimed trial fees and court
appearance fees for his services.

The only fee ever

asserted or claimed by the Blacks against Hulbert is the $18,5·00
as set forth in Exhibit 4-P.

As to whether he ever discussed

hourly fees with his counsel, Hulbert testified that he did
not and "that was the least of my concerns."
24.

(R. 169-170.• }]

Though $77,275.00 is within the "reasonable"

range, some adjustment is appropriate because Hulbert
enjoyed a close personal relationship with counsel, and some
of the services provided were rendered with no expectation
of payment because of that relationship.

Further, it is

possible that, in the absence of that high degree of personal
regard for Hulbert, more of the research and support services
might have been provided by law clerks and junior members
of the firm, at a lower cost.

Finally, Hulbert's ability to

pay in this case is limited and dependent upon access to
reimbursement by the State.

Those additional factors

presented by defendant result in a reasonable discount of
20 percent of the attorney's fees to the sUM of $61,820.00,
which is also within the "reasonable" range.
(This finding that Hulbert's ability to pay is
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Services and Technology
Act, administered
Utah State Library.
lim1ted and Library
dependent
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State is clearly supportive of the fact, as before noted,
that the legal fees "necessarily incurred" by Hulbert in this
case, as measured by the basic ingredient of his ability to
pay and not the ability of the State of Utah to pay such
fees, is established by the fee set by his attorneys in
Exhibit 4-P and Hulbert's incomplete payment thereof.)
25.

Hulbert necessarily incurred costs of court

in the amount of $564.99 in the defense of the Grand Jury
Indictments.
26.

The intent of the legislature as determined

by the recording of legislative debate at the time of the
passage of Section 63-20a-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, was
that such "reasonable attorney's fees • • • necessarily
incurred" are to be paid by the State of Utah out of the
General Fund after such amount is determined by a Court of
competent jurisdiction.
In addition to the foregoing facts as found by
the lower court and to which appellant has noted its
exceptions from the record in this case, it should be pointed
out that Mr. Hulbert himself testified that he may have stated
to members of the legislative analyst's

office who were trying

to determine the financial impact of Hulbert's legislation in
the 1977 Legislature that he was obligated to pay $32,000
to his attorneys for legal services reimbursable thereunder.
(R. 346-348.) This was substantiated by Douglas A. McDonald,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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a fiscal economist with the legislative fiscal analyst,
who testified that he met with Mr. Hulbert during
the 1977 legislative session at the State Capitol to
determine the fiscal impact of Mr. Hulbert's bill-Senate Bill No. 247--and Mr. Hulbert estimated his
attorneys• fess thereunder to be "around $30,000" and
that legal fees under the bill could run from $10,000
to $40,000 per indictment.

(R. 348-352).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT WAS NITHOUT JURISDICTION
TO HEAR THIS MATTER WHICH JURISDICTION WAS
VESTED EXCLUSIVELY IN THE BOARD OF EXAMINERS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH.
The respondent sought recovery of $77,815.65
for attorneys fees and costs allegedly incurred in the
defense of nine grand jury indictments issued in 1975 in
connection with the performance of his duties as chairman
and director of the Utah State Liquor Control Commission.
The sole basis for the complaint was the enactment of
Senate Bill No. 24 7 contained in Chapter 245 of the Lav7s
of Utah 1977, now included in Sections 63-30a-l, 2 and 3,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended.

Section 63-30a-2

thereof provides as follows:
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"If a state grand jury indicts an
officer or employee, in connection with
or arising out of any act of omission of
that officer or employee during the
performance of his duties, 1-1i thin the
scope of his employment or under color
of his authority, and that indictment is
quashed or dismissed or results in a
judgment of acquittal, unless the indictm~nt is quashed or dismissed upon
application or motion of the prosecuting
attorney, that officer or employee shall
be entitled to recover from the state the
reasonable attorneys' fees and court
costs necessarily incurred in the defense
of that indictment."
The foregoing enactment by the 1977 Utah Legislature
did not provide funding for the payment of claims thereunder
and the Legislature has made no appropriations for that
purpose.

The respondent's complaint does not allege that any

such appropriation was ever made by the legislature.

Under

these circumstances the respondent's claim is controlled
by Article VII, Section 13, and Article V, Section 1, of
the Utah Constitution, and Sections 63-6-1 and 63-6-10, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, as amended, pertaining to the powers
of the Board of Examiners of the State of Utah and the
separation of powers between the legislative,
and judicial branches of state government.

execu~ive

Article VII,

Section 13 of the Utah Constitution provides as follows:
"***They [the Governor, Secretary
of State and Attorney General) shall,
also, constitute a Board of Examiners,
with power to examine all claims aqainst
the state except salaries or comnensation
of officers fixed by law, and perform
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such other duties or may be prescribed
by law~ and no claim against the State,
except for salaries and comoensation
of officers fixed by law, shall be passed
upon by the Legislature without having
been considered and acted Upon by the
said Board of Examiners."
(Emphasis
added.)
It is well established that the foregoing constitutional
provision grants broad powers to the Board of Examiners in
examining into and determining the merits of claims asserted
against the state.

The Supreme Court of the State of Utah

so held in Wood v. Budge, 13 U.2d 359, 374 P.2d 516 (1962)
and explained the purpose therefor as follmV"s, at page 519 of
Pacific Reporter:
"Although the privilege is not ours
to pass upon the wisdom of legislative
action, we think it is not amiss to point
out that due to the extent of its oowers
as to such claims, the Legislature-should
regard its responsibility as correspondingly
grave~ and should bear in minn these facts:
That the duty of examining into claims against
the State was undoubtedly given to the Board
of Examiners because the officers comprising
it can be assured to be acquainted with the
fiscal affairs of the State and to have a
high sense of responsibility therefor; that
the Board has better facilities at its command
for investigation and inquiry into such
matters than has the Legislature, including
the fact that the Attorney General as the
States' legal advisor was made a member of
the Board purposely so that he and his staff
could be of help in determining whether an
asserted 'claim' against the State has any
valid foundation, or whether it is simply a
request for a gift or some other meritless
attempt to obtain public funds, masquerading
under the guise of such a 'claim'.
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"For these reasons it is unquestionable that this function of the Board of
Examiners was intended to be regarded
as an important one; and that it is the
legislative duty to give serious consideration to its recommendations to the end that
such claims be acted upon with prudence and
wisdom to best serve the interests of the whole
State and avoid making grants in cases where
the State should assume no responsibility."
In the case of unliquidated claims, as is involved
in the case at bar, the Supreme Court of Utah has emphatically
stated that the constitutional powers of the Board of Examiners
include the right to investigate and act as a fact finder and
advisor to the legislature, and that even as to liquidated
claims its pmV'ers extend beyond mere auditing.

See Bateman v.

Board of Examiners, 7 U.2d 221, 322 P.2d 381, 382,
prior cases therein quoted with approval.

(1953), and

In that case the

court, with direct reference to the constitutional provision
hereinabove set forth, stated as follows at Page 384 of the
Pacific Reporter:
"The question of importance is the
extent of the authority conferred by the
language, '***with power to examine all
claims against the state.'
This phraseology
has given rise to much concern over the
reciprocal powers and interrelationships
of the departments of our state government.
In the first place we think that the word
'claim' was used in its broadest connotation
and we recognize that it is susceptible of a
variety of meanings:
ranging from a normal
claim; or the seeking of legislative
largesse; or asserting a privilege; to
asserting rights to compensation for
property or materials furnished, or salary
for services rendered, to the stRte."
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With respect to the power of the Board of
Examiners to examine and approve claims for whicn the
legislature had already provided recourse the court in the
Bateman case cited and quoted with approval from the case of
State ex rel. Davis v. Edwards, 33

u.

243, 93 P. 720 (1908) as

follows at Page 386 of 322 P.2d Reporter:
"This case (referring to ~1arioneaux
v. Cutler, 32 u. 475, 91 P. 355) was
followed by State ex rel. Davis v. Edwards
wherein a court reporter sought to compel
the State Auditor to allow his claim for
mileage which the District Judge had
certified as correct. The statute stated
that upon such certification by the judge and
presentation of the certificate to the
Auditor a warrant should be drawn for payment.
In spite of this statute the Auditor refused,
relying on Sec. 18, Ch. 35, L. 1896 which
required approval of Examiners before he
could draw the warrant. The court held that
the claim must be presented to Examiners for
approval as required by statute and used some
very pointed language pertinent to the instant
problem:
'The powers conferred upon the
Board of Examiners, with regard to claims
against the state, by the constitutional
provision quoted above, are general and
sweeping. The power would include all
claims against the state, were it not for
the exception which excludes salaries or
compensation of officers fixed by law.
An exception of this character may not
be enlarged nor extended by implication.
An exception which specifies the things
that are excepted from a general provision
strenghens the force of the general provisions
of the law. '
(Emphasis added.) "
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The court in the Bateman case cited another case
avropos to the powers of the Board of Examiners with respect
to claims for liquidated claims in which the legislature had
authorized the bounty to be paid for killing coyotes, as
follows, at Pages 386-387 of 322 P.2d Reporter:
''The landmark case on this subject
is that of Uintah State Bank v. Ajax.
(77 U. 455, 297 P. 434). Action was
brought to compel the State auditor to
issue warrants to pay bounty certificates
for killing predatory animals (coyotes).
The plaintiff contended that inasmuch as the
statute fixed the amount to be paid for each
animal killed and directed the Auditor to
issue the warrant upon the certificate of the
County Clerk, and further that nothing in the
act required submission of the claims to
Examiners, the Auditor must issue the warrant
upon presentation of the certificate.
The
bank argued that the amount having been thus
'fixed by law,' there was nothing but the
ministerial duty of paying the claim and hence
it was unnecessary to present it to Examiners.
The contention was rejected by the court, saying:
'The claims here are not fixed by
law in the sense that the legislature
has made an appropriation of an amount
certain to a definite named person.'
and further,
'all claims are subject to action
by the Board of Examiners except only
claims for "salaries and compensation
of officers fixed by law."'
"It refused to agree that Examiners should
examine only 'unliquidated' claims against the
state, using the following languaq~:
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I
'

'If we should adopt petitioner's
view, it would follow that the legislature might designate any officer other
than the Board of Examiners as authorized
in behalf of the state to settle, fix,
or liquidate claims and agree upon the
amount to be paid thereon, and thereby
exclude the Board of Examiners from its
duty ***· We cannot agree to any such
construction of the constitutional
language, nor may we by construction
interpolate the word "unliquidated"
into the Constitution [which] *** has
vested in the Board of Examiners the power
to examine and pass on all claims except
those exempted, and the Legislature is
without authority to delegate such power
to any other board of officer.'"
The court went on to state:
'If the view is taken that the
Legislature intended to make this claim
payable by the Auditor without presentation
to the Board of Examiners, then the Legislature attempted to do that which it had no
authority to-effectuate, and in this question
the language in the case of State ex rel.
Davis v. Edwards is not only appropr~ate
but decisive.'"
The court then concluded in Bateman that, in the
absence of any capricious or arbitrary actions, the Board of
Exa~iners

and its

ad~inistrative

arm, the CoMMission of Finance,

have authority to examine and approve or disapprove of
proposed expenditures, to adopt regulations pertaining
generally to salary schedules and personnel in accordance
with the statutes conferring such power upon them, and that
the Superintendent of Public Instruction and the Board of
Education are subject thereto in a similar manner to other
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney
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It has long been the established law in this state
that Article VII, Section 13, of the Utah Constitution is
an inhibition upon the maintenance of an action directly
against the state.

Thus in holding that the district court

did not have jurisdiction to entertain an action for alleged
damages to land and crops resulting from the breaking of an
irrigation canal, the court in Wilkinson v. State, 42 U. 483,
134 P. 626, reasoned as follows as to the organic power of
the Board of Examiners:
"***In a very recent case the
Supreme Court of Idaho has again considered
the question and in our judgment has settled
it under a constitutional provision like
ours. The court there holds that although
expressly authorized to entertain actions
against the state, yet the court cannot do
so until the claim has been submitted to and
passed upon by the Board of Examiners.
Thomas et al. v. State, 16 Idaho 81,
100 Pac. 761. The reasoning of both the
Nevada and Idaho Supreme Courts seems
reasonable and logical. It is pointed out
by those courts that the Board of Examiners
is a creature of the Constitution, and
that the courts are no more than that.
It is
also suggested that neither can exercise
powers t~at are withheld by the instru~ent.
The people of this state, who are responsible I
for the Constitution and its terr'1s, had the rig:'
to confer or withhold power as to them seemed
proper. If, therefore, they erected a tribunal
and conferred powers upon it to hear and
determi·,·:c the justness of all claims not
specifically otherwise provided for, the will
of the people must be obeyed by the courts as
well as bv all others. As we have seen, even
the Legislature is prevented from passing upon
any claim until th~ same has hcen passed on hy
the State Board of Exaniners.
The conditions
1
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upon which a claimant may have his claim
considered and passed on by the Legislature
of this state are provided for in Camp. Laws
1907, § 945. In the same compilation,
Sections 929 to 949 x 1, inclusive, the duties
of the Board of Examiners and the procedure to
be followed in presenting and disposing of
claims are fully set forth.
A constitutional
tribunal is therefore provided for in this
state in which any claimant may be heard and
from whose decision he may appeal to the
only power which can provide funds for the
payment of his claim if found just and if it
be allowed. This is all any claimant can
reasonably ask."
In addition to the Constitution and cases above
cited, the legislature has clearly recognized the power of
the Board of Examiners to examine and act upon all claims
against the state for which funds have not been provided for
payment.

Thus Section 63-6-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as

amended, provides as follovTS:
"The governor, the secretary of state
and the attorney general shall constitute
a Board of Examiners, with power to examine
all claims against the state for which funds
have not been provided for the payment thereof,
except salaries or compensation of officers
fixed by la1v. No claim against the state for
which funds have not been provided, except
salaries and comnensation of officers fixed
by law, shall be.passed upon by the legislature
without having been considered and acted upon
by the Board of Examiners.***."
(Underlined
portions added by amendment in 1963.)
Andin cases such as the one here involved, Section 63-6-10,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, provides:
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"If no appropriation has been made
for the payment of any claim presented to
the board, the settlement of which is
provided for by law, or if an appropriation
made has been exhausted, the board must
audit the claim, and, if it is approved,
must transmit it to the legislature ''lith a
statement of the reasons for the approval."

I

I

The following Section 63-6-11 mandates the filing of such
claims with the Board of Examiners:
"Any person having a claim against the
state for which funds have not been provided
for the payment thereof, or the settlement of
which is not otherwise provided for by law,
must present the same to the board of examiners,
accompanied by a statement showing the facts
constituting the claim."
The broad power and discretion of the Board of Examiners in
dealing with claims against the state is found in Section
63-6-13, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended:
"The board must at the time designated
proceed to examine and adjust all such claims
referred to in section [63-6-11] of this act,
and may hear evidence in support of or against
them, and shall report to the legislature
such facts and recommendations concerning
them as it may think proper.
In making its
recommendations the board may state and use
any official or personal knowledge which
any member of the board nay have touching such
clains. The board shall not pass upon or send
to the legislature any claim for which the
state would not otherwise be liable were it not
for its sovereign imnunity. But all claims
wherein the state would be liable, were it
not for its sovereign iMmunity, whether
recommended bv the board for approval or
disapproval, ~hall be reported by the hoard to
the legislature with appropriate findings and
reconrnendations as above providecl."
Thus, the Board of Examiners is directed not to transmit claims
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of

t~

state disregarding sovereign immunity but it must report all
other claims to the legislature with its findings and
recommendation as to approval or disapproval.
The respondent

in this case has circumvented

both the organic law and legislature pronouncements by the
submission of his claim for attorneys' fees to the district
court rather than the Board of Examiners of the State of Utah.
Such claim is an unliquidated claim for which there has been
no legislative appropriation for payment.

In such cases the law

of the State of Utah as determined by its Constitution, its
legislature and its highest court has clearly established
that the district court is without jurisdiction to hear the
matter and the Board of Examiners of the State of Utah has
the exclusive right to examine and determine the validity of
such claim and, if appropriate, to report its findings and
recommendations thereon to the state legislature for final
resolution of the matter.
The respondent will undoubtedly assert, as he did in
the court belo·", that the Supreme Court of Utah, in the case of
campbell Bldg. Co. v. State Road Commission, 95 U. 242, 70
P.2d 857 (1937), has determined that claimants with unliquidated
claims against the State of Utah may proceed to have those
claims liquidated in court notwithstanding the constitutional
powers of the Board of Examiners and the Legislature to
examine such claims and appropriate money to satisfy the same.
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The plaintiff acknowledges that any judgment so obtained
in this court would necessarily have to be submitted to
the Board of Examiners and thence to the Legislature which
would grant or deny the same.

Under that reasoning the

plaintiff is asking the court system to engage in a timeconsuming and useless effort.

The judiciary should not

be imposed upon to perform an idle function any more than
individuals should not be required to perform useless acts.
See Leger Construction, Inc. v. Roberts, Inc., 550 P.2d
212 (Utah, 1976) and Ericksen v. Poulsen, 15 U.2d 190,
389 P.2d 739.

Thus courts will ordinarily decline to

decide purely abstract questions or issues.
Courts, § 81.

20 Am.Jur.2d,

It has also been held that a court may not

exercise jurisdiction if it is without power to enforce its
adjudication.

In Bankers Trust Co. v. Greims, 110 Conn. 36,

147 A. 290, 66 A.L.R. 726, an action in which a Connecticut
statute providing that a surviving spouse be entitled to the
use for life of one-third in value of all the property owned
by decedent was sought to be made applicable to real property
in other states, the court held as follows at pp. 730-731
of the A.L.R. Reporter:
"The answer to this sitaution,
counsel urge, is that the fact thQt the
court could not enforce its decree would
constitute no adequate reason for not
carrying out the mandate of the stotute,
and enforcing it as far as it was ahle to.
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Such a deCree would be a mere gesture
of power. We ought not to conclude that
the legislature intended so futile a
result unless the compulsion of that
construction is inescapable. It is a
fundamental Principle that courts will not
adjudicate when they cannot enforce."
(Emphasis added.)
Also holding that a court will not adjudicate where
it cannot enforce the adjudication are In re De Ford, 226
N.C. 189, 37 s.E.2d 516, and State v. Hyde, 88 Ore. 1, 169
P. 757.

In view of the foregoing and the extensive
consideration given by our Supreme Court to the powers of
the Board of Examiners and the Legislature to examine and
consider unliquidated claims against the State of Utah, as
hereinabove pointed out, it is clear that the decision of
our Supreme Court in the Campbell case has not become settled
law which, in effect, permits a sterile court proceeding as
a prelude to the exercise of constitutional and statutory
powers by the Board of Examiners and the State Legislature.
The Supreme Court of Utah in Bateman v. Board of Examiners,
7 U. 2d 221, 322 P.2d 381, long after the Campbell case,
recognized the broad power of the Board of Examiners to
investigate claims and act as a fact finder and advisor to the
legislature with respect to unliquidated claims.

It also

recognized that the function of the Board of Examiners was not
merely to audit, even in the case of liquidated claims.

Thus,

this court has most recently reaffirmed the constitutional
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status of the Board of Examiners in much the same manner
as did the court in Wilkinson v. State, 42

u.

483, 143 P.

626, which the plaintiff asserts has been replaced as
controlling law by the Campbell decision.

It is clear

that the plaintiff has not carefully analyzed the holding
in the Bateman case nor the prior cases cited therein that
the legislature has no power to circumvent the right
of the Board of Examiners to exercise its constitutional
power to act upon all claims (in the broadest sense) by
permitting others to settle, fix or liquidate such claims.
Such holding would have equal application to the district
courts and reaffirms the principal established in the
Wilkinson decision that avoids the futility of time-consuming
and meaningless litigation with respect to such claims.
The decision in Bateman was again reaffirmed in the
case of Toronto v. Clyde, 15 U.2d 403, 393 P.2d 795 (1964),
in which the court declared invalid legislation permitting the
department of finance to "examine and pass upon all proposed
expenditures" of state agencies and precluding meaningful
fiscal control by the Board of Examiners.

In that case the

court stated as follows at page 796 and 798 of the P. 2cl Reporter:
"The extent of the power conferred
upon Examiners by the language, '*** with
power to examine all claims against the
state***,' has been before this court on
a number of occasions since statehood.
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In the case of Bateman v. Board of
Examiners, we gave extensive consideration
of this problem and reviewed the Utah
decisions dealing with.it. Upon the basis
of the constitutional language, its background and history, including the decisional
law of the state, we concluded that the
framers intended to vest in the constitutional
officers--the governor, the secreta~y of
state and the attorney general, who are
elected by and are thus directly responsible
to the people--more than a mere auditing
function, that is, power to examine into
the advisability and necessity of any
disbursement or proposed obligation
of the statei***"
It

* * *

"As we have heretofore stated, from the
endowment of Examiners with the 'power to
examine all claims' it is only reasonable to
assume that it was intended that they should .
perform that duty. However, as aptly observed
by Judge Ellett, who tried the case below,
'This does not preclude Examiners from
establishing reasonable rules and procedures
concerning its method of examining claims.' This
could include the Department of Finance or other
agencies to determine facts and certify claims
so long as under the procedure adopted the
ultimate authority and the duty of pass1ng upon
claims remains with the Board of Examiners."
(Emphasis added.)
It is abundantly clear from the foregoing that the
Board of Examiners, not the courts, has the right to determine
the methods and procedures by which it exercises its constitutional powers and that it has the ultimate authority and duty to
pass upon all claims such as the one here presented to the
Third District Court.

Any court proceeding to ascertain facts

and conclusions of law with respect to such claims would be
outside the scope of legislative authorization as well as
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being superfluous, meaningless and incapable of enforcement.
Such an unconstitutional act of futility on the part of
the lower court should have been wisely and judiciously
avoided by dismissing the complaint as prayed for by the
appellant, and the lower court clearly erred in failing to
do so.
The respondent and lower court apparently rely
upon the Governmental Immunity Act (Chapter 30 of Title 63,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended) as the basis for seeking
recovery in the courts rather than pursuing the route
prescribed by the Utah Constitution and statutes as above
set forth.

The only basis for such contention is Section

63-30a-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by Chapter
245 of the Laws of Utah, 1977, which provides as follows:
"This act shall apply to claims
arising prior to the effective date
of this act so long as those claims
are filed in the manner provided in the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act and
within two years after the cause of
action arises."
The purpose of the foregoing portion of the statute, as part
of the act pRrmitting recovery of attorneys' fees for dismissal
or acquittal of grand jury indictments against public officers
or employees, was solely to grant retroactive effect to the
legislation so as to have application to the respondent's
claim which arose in 1975.

In so doing the legislature

merely provided the manner by which such prior claims were
to be filed.

It did not extend application of

th0

Governmental
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Immunity Act in any manner whatsoever to claims arising
subsequent to the effective date of the Act and only
provided that the manner of filing claims arising within.
the two years preceding such effective date should be as
prescribed in the Governmental Immunity Act.

The

legislature did not extend the applicability of the
Governmental Immunity Act to such claims other than in
the very narrow area above noted and to imply that an
action could be commenced thereunder against the State
of Utah would be contrary to the constitutional and
decisional law as hereinabove discussed and the express
provision of Section 63-6-12, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
as amended, which provides the time within which the Board
of Examiners must act upon claims presented to it.

That

section provides as follows:
"At least sixty days preceding
the meeting of each legislature the
board must hold a session for the
purpose of examining the claims
referred to in the last preceding
section, and may adjourn from time
to time until the work is completed.
The board must cause notice of
such meeting or meetings to be published
in some newspaper at the seat of govern·'ment and such other newspaper as may be
determined by the board for such time
as the board may prescribe."
The manner of filing claims against the State of
Utah under the Governmental Immunity Act is set forth
under Section 63-30-12 thereof which provides:
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"A claim against the state or
any agency thereof as defined herein
shall be forever barred unless
notice thereof is filed with the
attorney general of the state of
Utah and the agency concerned within
one year after the cause of action
arises."
In view of the constitutional powers of the Board of
Examiners as hereinabove set forth it follows that
compliance with the foregoing statute would not preclude
the Board of Examiners from the exercise of its powers,
and any additional application of the Governmental Immunity
Act contrary to the exercise of that power must fail.
Thus in construing the applicability of Section 63-30a-3
to the facts of the present case, it is clear that the
legislature intended its application to be in harmony with
constitutional requirements.

Thus the filing requirement

of Section 63-30a-3 merely requires that a notice of
retroactive claims thereunder be given by filing the same
with the Attorney General and the state agency concerned.
It does not purport to supplant the constitutional
jurisdiction of the Board of Examiners by an action to be
commenced in district court and, indeed, any such
construction would itself be unconstitutional.

It is

well established law in this jurisdiction that where
there are two alternatives as to the interpretation of
a statute, one of which would make it constitutionally
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the latter will prevail.

See Wagner

v. Salt Lake City

Corp., 29 U.2d 42, 504 P.2d 1007 (1972) and State Water
Poll,ution Control Board v. Sal.t Lake City corp., 6
0.2d 247, 311 P.2d 370.

It therefore follows that the

filing and notice requirements of the foregoing statutes
must be construed in harmony with the jurisdictional power
of the Baord of Examiners in this case which would preclude
the district court from exercising jurisdiction other than
to dismiss the complaint herein.
The res:oondent will undoubtedly argue that the
provision of Section 63-30-23 of the Governmental Immunity
Act contemplates court actions directly against the State
of Utah after whichthejudgment therein obtained may be
presented to the Board of Examiners and the legislature
pursuant to statutory and constitutional provisions.

It

provides as follows:
"Any claim approved by the state
as defined herein or any final judgment
obtained against the state shall be
presented to the office, agency,
institution or other instrumentality
involved for payment if payment by said
instrumentality is otherwise permitted
by law. If sv~h payment is not authorized
by law then said judgment or claim shall
be presented to the board of examiners and
the board shall proceed as provided in
section 63-6-10, Utah Code Annotated,
1953."
Any such construction of the foregoing statute or the entire
Governmental I~unity Act as granting to the district courts
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the power to reduce unliquidated claims against the state
to liquidated judgments for satisfaction by the Board of
Examiners and the legislature must fail for several reasons:
1.

The constitutional and statutory powers of the

Board of Examiners would thereby be reduced to a mere auditing
function which the legislature and the Supreme Court have
soundly denounced.
2.

The constitutional power of the legislature

to make appropriations of public funds would be usurped
by the courts.
3.

This action for recovery of attorneys' fees

pursuant to Section 63-30a-2, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
as enacted in 1977, is not included within the

cl~sses

of

actions to which the Governmental Immunity Act has
application.
4.

The only application that the Governmental

Immunity Act has to the plaintiff's claim is the notice
requirement thereof as adopted by Section 63-30a-3,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, enacted in 1977.
POL-JT II
THE EVIDE{KE 1:1 THIS CASE FAILS TO SUPPOR'.::'
THE DECREE A>JD JUDGf!EcJT OF THE LOI~F.R C\lVRT
AND THE SUBSEQUE:n "AGREEHEc'JT" BET\~EEN RESPONDE;JT AND HIS _-".T'::'OWJEYS, IF A:-JY, AS f'OU:JD
BY THI: LO'~ER COURT, "IOULD BE IUVALTD.
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The evidence in this case admits of only one
conclusion with respect to the legal fees "necessarily
incurred" by the respondent as required under Section
63-30a-2, Utah Code Annotated 1953, enacted in 1977:
that the only enforceable claim that respondent's
attorneys could ever assert for legal fees arising from
the defense of the grand jury indictments issued against
him in 1975 is that set forth in the letter dated September 3, 1976, from Wayne L. Black, on behalf of himself,
his brother John and his law firm, to the respondent at
his request, in which the total fee for all such services
is set at $18,500 as follows in Exhibit 4-P:
Mr. Gerald E. Hulbert
4964 1'/aimea V.Jay
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Dear Jerry:
In a way I hate to write this letter because it is always unpleasant to bill a client
who is a close friend and I had frankly decided that I would not bill you until the
final case was diseased of, and, hopefully,
diseased of in a f~vorable way.
However, it
doe~ appear that there is a likelihood of
considerable delay in the disposition of the
final case, and~ consequently, I thought I
would write you a letter analyzing the fee
situation.
You will recall that on May 22, 1975, I
wrote you a letter outlining the fee situation.
At that time only the one indictment had been
presented and none of us had any way of know~ng
that the other indictments would be forthcom1ng.
on the basis of the first indictment the agreement
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,
was that you would pay a $5,000 retainer, that
if the case was tried one or more times an additional $5,000 fee would be charged,and that
in the event the case was appealed an additional
$2,000 fee would be charged.
Of course, the case was tried and in addition we have had two appeals to the Supreme
Court with one involving the first indictment
and one involving the later indictments.
In
addition, as you know, we have had another trial
and arguments on innumerable motions. The
possibility still exists of the necessity of
t:tying the last remaining case.•
John and I have given this matter very
considerable thought. You have paid up to
date $8,500. Under the existing contract, on
the first case, the remainder of the fee for said
case, which is owing, is $3,500. We will consider the entire fee, including whatever pro
cedures, whether it be a trial or something less
than a trial, and also including a possible
appeal, if you paid an additional $10,000, to
constitute the total fee. This $10,000 would,
of course, include the $3,500 owed on the first
case.
(Emphasis added.)
We will keep you advised of further developments in the remaining case.
With warmest personal regards, I am.
Yours sincerely,
RAHLINGS,

ROBERTS

&

BLACK

l·IAYHE L. BLACK

With respect to the foregoing letter, Wayne L. Black
testified that, in writing the foregoing letter, it was
his intent to set an amount for legal services beyond
which he would not assert any legal claim against rlr.
Hulbert.

That testimony was as follows:
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i

1
I

I

I

Q. And wasn't it your intent in writing
the letter that is an exhibit here that I
think i~ dated September the 3rd, that you
were go1ng to satisfy him by setting an amount
beyond which you would not assert any legal
claim against him?
A. That's right.
(R. 322.)
In response to said letter, the respondent left
a note at his attorney's offices dated September 10, 1976,
(Exhibit 5-P) indicating his concern as to making a prompt
payment of the bill and expressing his gratefulness for
all they had done for a very minimal charge, and by subsequent letter dated September 9, 1977, (Exhibit 1-D)
confirmed the foregoing fee agreement and his prior
approval thereof.
would this court, or any court for that matter,
given the foregoing undisputed facts, ever lend its office
to the recovery of a fee of $61,820 in an
Black against !1r. Hulbert personally?

action by Mr.

The answer is so

patently obvious as to defy reason otherwise.

Yet by the

legerdemain of an underlying desire of the respondent to
pay his attorneys more than he had the ability to do
personally with

a

legislative program conceived and

brought to fruition by the respondent the lower court
has imposed a burden upon the citizens of this state
which it never would have imposed upon the respondent himself.
In doing so, the court has clearly evidenced its disdain for
the protection of the public purse and indicated the ease with
which public servants may spend the hard-earned taxes of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1
raid on the state treasury would induce every person charged
under grand jury indictments hereafter to arrange a dual-fee
arrangement with his attorney--one fee based upon his own
ability to pay in the event he is convicted and another
sky-is-the-limit fee in the event he is exonerated.

The

legislature never intended Section 63-30a-2 to be a
lawyer's sweepstakes enrichment act.

That section requires

absolutely that the legal fees recoverable from the State
thereunder must have been "necessarily incurred" in the
successful defense of grand jury indictments.

The legal

fees necessarily incurred in such cases should not vary
by hundreds of percent depending upon guilt or innocence.
Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that
Mr. Hulbert had been found guilty of the charges against
him.

Is there any conceivable basis upon which it could

then be asserted that he "necessarily incurred" a fee
greater than the $18,500 evidenced by Exhibit 4-P?

Surely,

the legislature did not intend such term to have a
different meaning

w~en

applied to the State's obligation

under the statute than it has when applied to the individual's own circumstances.

The statute, in effect, renders

the obligation of the individual to be that of the State-no more, no less.

In this sense the transfer or substi-

tution of liability should be similar to that of a

~rin

cipal for the acts of his agent, in \-lhich it is well establio!l
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I

'

Under such circumstances, the legal fees "necessarily
incurred" by the respondent are fixed by the billing
contained in Exhibit 4-P and the liability of the State
of Utah should be limited to that amount.
The error of the lm'ler court is evident in its

mm findings of fact.

It necessarily had to find as a

matter of fact that an important factor in determining a
reasonable attorney's fee is the client's ability to pay.
(Finding of Fact No. 21, R. 112.)

The evidence in the case

is undisputed that the respondent's ability to pay has
been limited to an amount less than his attorneys billed
him in Exhibit 4-P.

'i.'hus, at the time of trial in this

case in October, 1978, he had paid his attorneys the total
sum of $10,000 for legal fees incurred in the subject
grand jury indictments (R. 178) notwithstanding his
assurance on September 10, 1976,

(Exhibit 5-P) that he would

be as prompt in the payment of what he considered to be
a very minimal bill as he could be.

And certainly his most

qualified trial counsel oust have taken that factor into
consideration in rendering his bill for legal services set
forth in Exhibit 4-P, albeit it is seemingly high in light
of the actual circumstances of the respondent.

Mr. Hulbert

also testified that he told clr. Black, after receiving the
$18,500 bill, that "I would make it right with him if I
could find it in my means at any time."

(R. 153.) Apparently,
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exceeded his ability to do so as his total payment of
$10,000 thereon clearly indicates.

In overcoming this seemingly insurmountable
obstacle, the lmver court had to admit that the "plaintiff's
ability to pay in this case is limited and dependant upon
access to reimbursement by the State."
No. 24, R.ll3.)

(Finding of Fact

In light of this and other factors, the

total claim of the plaintiff below was reduced by 20% to
$61,820.

In doing so, the court clearly did not go far

enough and subGtituted the State's ability to pay for that
of the respondent Hulbert.

There

sim~ly

is no evidence in

the record to sustain the ability of the respondent to pay
$60 per hour

($75 less 20%) for 621 hours plus $8,000

($10,000 less 20%)
20%)

for one jury trial, $6,000 ($7,500 less

for one non-jurytrial, and $170 ($200 less 20%) for each

of 66 court appearances other than trial and appeals.

And it

is submitted that such fees would fall within the capability of
1

extremely few individuals, regardless of the "reasonableness" thereof as determined by the court, based on the
expert testimony of attorney vlitnesses in the case.

Tile

crucial element of ability to pay together with the other
elements considered in deterr,1ining a reasonable attorney's
fee in this specific case were merged in the letter from
Hayne L. Black to his client on September 3, 1976, and no
ar:tount of verbal gymnastics or rhetoric in the record can
make valid the lower court's conjuredcontract thereafter on
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13. The plaintiff intended his obligation
to be one for reasonable fees at a then undetermined level, and his counsel intended that
t~e obligation would be contingent upon pl~in
t~ff's future ability to pay.
(Emphasis added.)
The uncertainty and "iffiness" of any contract founded on
such a factual basis is so apparent as to require no further
elucidation.

Add to this the further contingency of the

passage of subsequent legislation and we have the ultimate

•

in contractual uncertainty.

Thus Findings of Fact Nos •

18 and 19 (R. 112) provide:
18. The plaintiff and his counsel agreed
that plaintiff would pay reasonable attorneys
fees if an when plaintiff obtained the means.
19. The passage of Section 60-30a-2,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, by the Legislature
was, in fact, the occurrence of the condition
precedent, or contingency, upon which plaintiff's
obligation hinged. Plaintiff is now obligated
by his own promise to pay a reasonable fee for
services rendered, and he has "incurred" such
a fee within the meaning of the statute.
(Emphasis added.)
The statute here involved permits recovery by the respondent
for attorney's fees "necessarily incurred" by him in the
defense of the grand jury indictments here involved.
evidence is undisputed that he had

"incur~ed"

The

attorney's

fees of $18,500 and anything received by him in addition
thereto would constitute an unjust enriclu.1ent.

If such

recovery was intended for the benefit of the attorneys
thenthe real party in interest is not before the court, as
was pointed out to the lower court at ~- 164-168.

But the

preceedings before the Utah House of Representatives upon
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clearly indicates that the lawmakers only intended "reimbursement" to the aggrieved public officer or employee-not a windfall to his attorneys.
With respect to the "contract" envisioned by
the lower court as superseding the only enforceable agreement
between the respondent and his attorneys, this court has
spoken in rather clear terms.

Thus in Skeen v. Peterson.

113 U. 483, 196 P.2d 708, 712, the court held as follows:

* * * After the attorney-client relationship has been entered into, the parties thereto
may change the terms of their agreement or
enter into an entirely new agreement, and if the
substituted agreement was entered into after
full and fair disclosure by the attorney, such
an agreement will be upheld.
However, such
contracts are looked upon with great-suspicion
by the courts, and there is a presumption that
such agreements are invalid, esoecially where
the result thereof is to increase the compensation to be received by the attorney, or is
otherwise of greater advantage to him.
(Emphasis added.)
The court then concluded that money paid by ·ti1e plaintiffattorney to outside counsel could not be recovered by the
t)laintiff as par-t of his compensation.

Under the facts of

the case at bar, it would apoear unquestionable that any
attempt by the respondent's attorneys to recover fees against
him in addition to the $18,500 amount as set forth in
Exhibit 4-P would be doomed to failure under the holding
of the Skeen case.

And the public should be no less

protected than the attorney's client by

alleg~d

"agree-

ments" entered into subsequent to the creation of an
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the attorney is increased 3 1/2 times at the understood
expense of the public rather than the client.

The rationale

underlying the decision in t!1e foregoing Skeen case was
more fully explained in Ashton v. Skeen, 85

u.

489, 39 P.2d

1073:

Notwithstanding the rule that contracts between attorney and client are held to be valid,
if entirely fair and equitable, while the client
forms an entirely free and unfettered judgment, and within any sort of control, yet an
agreement between attorney and client, varying
the terms of the original contract or employment by allowing the attorney greater compensation
than therein provided, is sometimes held invalid,
regardless of whether it is fair or otherwise.
One of the earliest cases in the United States
is Lecatt v. Sallee, 3 Port. (Ala.) 115, 29
Am.Dec. 249. In the syllabus, which accurately
reflects the opinion, it is said that:
"An
agreement made by a client, with his counsel,
after the latter has been employed in a particular business, by which the original contract is
varied, and greater compensation is secured to
the counsel, than may have been agreed upon, when
first retained; is invalid, and cannot be enforced."
And the court gives the following reasons for
the rule:
"The firmest ground for the support of the
orinciole to which the complainant has resorted,
for relief, consists of the confidence reposed by
a client, in his attorney, and the influence
which an attorney has, ovar his client. * * *
Integrity of character and purity of motive, have
never enabled such contracts to stand in full
force, against the principle of equity, which
cor.unonly excludes all inquiry into the fairness
of the transactions, and sets them aside as violations of the policy of justice. * * *
"The principle will best preserve the high
reputation of the orofession, by elevating its
members above the temptation to exercise their
influence, to obtain advantageous bargains of
their clients; and consequently, above the susSponsored by the S.J. Quinney
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There are many cases which do not go as far
as this case, and the views .thereon are well
expressed by the Supreme Court of Nevada in
Moore v. Rochester >'Ieaver I.lining Co., 42 Nev.
164, 174 P. 1017, 1020, 19 A.L.R. 830, where
it is said:
"No principle has been so rigidly
adhered to by the courts of this country and
England than that \vhere an attorney deals with
his client for the former's benefit, the transaction is not only regarded with suspicion and
closely scrutinized, but i·t is presumptively
invalid on the ground of constructive fraud,
and that this presumption can be overcome only
by the clearest and most satisfactory evidence.
The rule is founded in public policy, and
operates independently of any ingredient of
actual fraud, being intended as a protection
to the client against the strong influence to
which the confidential relation nat~rally
gives rise."
In this case, the lower court specifically found
that the basis of the subsequent "agreement" between the
respondent and his attorneys was contingent upon transferring the obligation for increased attorneys'
the client to the taxpaying public.
13, 13 and 19, R. 111-112.)

(Findi~gs

fees from
of Fact

Such an "agreement" is invalid

under the foregoing authorities and contrary to public
policy, even
the evidence.

i~

sue~

an

"agree~ent"

can be tortured from

See also Centurian Corporation v. Ryberg,

McCoy & Halgren, 588 P. 2d 716

(Utah, 1978).

It is, therefore, the position of the appellant
that the evidence in this case does not sustain an enforceable contract between the respondent and his aLtorneys other
than that set forth in Exhibit 4-P, and evon if it does,
such subsequent "agreement" is presumptively invalid under
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the foregoing Utah cases and should be declared contrary
to public policy.

The reputation of attorneys is subject

to enough present criticism without granting to them a
special sweepstakes privilege at public expense.
POINT III
SECTION 63-30a-3, UTMI CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS
ENACTED IN 1977, CONSTITUTES RETROACTIVE LEGISLATION ffifiCH EXTINGUISHES VESTED RIGHTS IN
VIOLATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AHENDMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 7, OF THE UTAH CONSTITU'l'ION AND IT ALSO
RENDERS THE ENTIRE STATUTE PRIVATE OR SPECIAL
LEGISLATION IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE VI,
SECTION 26 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTIOH.
Section 63-30a-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
as enacted by Chapter 245 of the Latvs of Utah, 1977, provides as follows with respect to the right of the respendent to recover against the State of Utah as provided
in the preceding section:
This act shall apply to claims arising
prior to the effective date of this act so
long as those claims are filed in the manner
provided in the Utah Governmental Immunity Act
and within two years after the cause of action
arises.
It is o~ly by virtue of the foregoing provision
of the statute that the respondent had any standing at all
to bring the present action inasmuch as every claim for
attorneys fees asserted by hiQ arose prior to the enactment
of the statute which was tailored to cover such claims.
Although Utah has no specific constitutional

prohibition

ag~inst
legislation
as bysome
states
do,Library
the
law
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has evolved that such legislation is prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment when it divests any vested interest.
16 Am.Jur.2d, Constitutional Law, §416.
of Utah has recognized such restraint.
rel Stain v. Christensen, 84

u.

see

The Supreme Court
Thus in State ex

185, 35 P.2d 775, the court

was confronted by a statute requiring the State Treasurer
to give a bond but did not provide the time in which to do
so.

After his election and commencement of the term to

which he was elected, the legislature passed laws requiring
the Treasurer to give bond within sixty days after his
term commenced.

The court held as follows as page 787 of

the P.2d Reporter as to the retroactive legislation involved:

* * * In doing so no vested right nor obligatiooi'
of a contract was divested or impaired nor any
new obligation or duty created or imposed.
The
I
enactment merely fixed a time when the bond was
required to be given, the giving of which, as I
I
view the case, was by law required and in force
when Stain was elected and before he could legally
assume the duties of the office. * * * We have
no constitutional orovision as found in constitutions of some states forbidding not only ex post
facto laws but also retrospective laws or giving
retroactive operation or effect to a statute.
* * * I am not holding that a statute, however
characterized, may be given retrospective
operation, when by giving it such effect will
divest or impair vested rights or obligations
of a contract or i!npose ne\v obligations etc.
What I say is that the application of the
statute in question to the matter in hand does
not do that.
(Emphasis added.)
In Spanish Fork Hestfield Irrigation Co. v. Disl:dct Court
of Salt Lake County, 99 U.
denied 99

u.

527, 104 P.

2d 353, rehearing

SSG, 110 P. 2d 344, amendments tu a statute
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9ertaining to the duties of the State Engineer in water
controversies was involved.

In holding that such amendments

only changed procedural rights and could be retrospectively
applied inasmuch as there are no vested rights in procedure,
the court said, at page 360 of 104 P.2d:
Counsel for defendants is confusing the
distinction between a "vested" right in procedure from a "vested" right of action.
A vested right in procedure of a court is
quite different from a vested right of action.
With reference to a right of action i t is stated
in 6 R.C.L. under title "Constitutional Law",
p. 316, par. 304, as follows:
"A vested right
of action is property in the same sense in which
tangible things are property, and is equally
protected against arbitrary interference, and
whether it springs from contract or the principles of the common law, it is not competent
for the legislature to take it away."
And this court has approved and affirmed
this doctrine in the case of Halling v. Industrial Commission of Utah et al., 71 Utah 112, 263
P. 78, citing 2nd Cooley's Cons.L., 8th Ed., page
756, and cases cited in the footnote.
With respect to the divestment of property or
imposition of liability by retrospective legislation, the
la'" is well established.

Thus in 16 Am.Jur.2d,Constit.utional

Law, §426, the rule is thus stated as to taking property from
one person and vesting it in another:
Under the restraint which the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution imposes
upon retrospective legislation, as well as
under the restraints imposed thereon by state
constitutional provisions expressly prohibiting
the enactment of retrospective laws, a state
cannot be a nere act of the legislature take
property from one man and vest it in another
directly;
nor for
can
such
property,
the
retroSponsored by the S.J. Quinney
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transferred from one to another.
Hence, a statute
is unconstitutional which in effect, either by
legislative fiat or by direct or indirect operation
takes the property of one man and gives i t to
'
another.
As to vested rights in a defense to a cause of action, it
is stated as follows in 16 Am.Jur.2d,supra, §425:
While it has been said that there is no
vested right in a mere defense to a personal
demand, the general rule may conveniently be
summarized by stating that a vested right to
an existing defense is protected in like
manner as a right of action, with the exception
only of those defenses which are based on
informalities not affecting substantial rights.
Illustrations abound of defenses w~ich are
clearly substantial and of which a party cannot
be deprived.
(Citing Annotation, 113 A.L.R. 769.)
And with respect to the imposition of an obligation where
none existed previously, it is stated in 16 Am. Jur.2d,
supra, §433, as follows:
While in general a statute, operating upon
facts existing at the time of its passage, which
attempts to impose upon one person a debt or
duty to another, where there was no right and
no obligation in existence before the passage
of the act, is unconstitutional, where a moral
obligation exists, the legislature may give it
legal effect by a retroactive statute.
As to moral obligations there is authority to
sustain retroactive imposition upon the state or its
subdivisions of such obligations which were theretofore
unenforceable (l6A

C.J.S. Constitutional Law, §417) but

it is submitted that no moral obligation is involved in the
instant case.

Liability for the payment of attorneys fees
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by

agreement or express authorization by statute.

Walker v.

Sandwick, 548 P.2d 1273 (Utah, 1976); Hawkins v. Perry,
123 U.l6, 253 P.2d 898.

It has nothing to do with a moral

obligation and, if it did, \'lhy did the legislature limit
the obligation under Section 63-30a-2 to elected and appointed
officers and employees of public entities indicted for acts
within the scope of their employment.

Certainly such a

"moral" obligation, if it exists at all, would extend to
others required to defend against grand jury indictments as
well as public officers and employees.

Such limitation

of the beneficiaries of the act in question negates any
application of the "moral" obligation argument.
The statute here involved clearly creates an
obligation on the part of the defendant which did not exist
at the time the events giving rise thereto occurred.

There

was no moral obligation on the part of the state to pay
attorneys fees retroactively for any group of litigants~
let alone a specially favored group consisting of public
employees amonq

the general class of persons subject to

grand jury indictments.

In this respect, the legislation

would clearly appear to be private or special legislation in
violation of Article VI, Section 26, of the Utah Constitution
whicn provides:
No private or special law shall be enacted where
a 0eneral law can be applicable.
It is undi,;::>uted in this case that the respondent, at the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
urging of friends
members
of the
conceived
Library Servicesand
and Technology
Act, administered
by the legislatur2,
Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-49-

l
the idea of the legislation here involved, secured its preparation with the assistance of his attorneys, arranged its
introduction into the 1977 Legislature and personally
lobbied "many, many days" for its passage

(R. 156-160.)

The

retroactive provisions of Section 63-30a-3 were clearly
designed for Mr. Hulbert's own personal benefit.

in the framework of our organic law, it is hard to conceive
of any statute which would do so in the absence of the use
of private given names therein.
A law relating to particular persons or things
as a class is said to be general, while a law relating to
particular persons or things of a class is deemed special

N.W. 270.

Johnson v. City of Milwaukee, 88 Wis. 383, 60

Under the facts of the instant case, Section

63-30a-2 ap?lied prospectively to particular persons as a
class but the retroactive provisions of Section 63-30a-3
was clearly designed to extend the benefits thereunder to
extremely few particular persons of the class who had
become fixed and identifiable at that tine.

Such legis-

lation would appear to fall within the purview of 16 Am.Jur.
2d, Constitutional Law §531, wherein it is stated:

* * * Efforts are not infrequently made by interested parties to procure legislation in their
own behalf against other classes of the corm:mni ty,
but such legislaticJll is not favorec1 hy Uw courts,
and will be upheld only '"hen it is strictly wi t.'1in
the legitimate power of Congress or the state or
municipal legislatures.
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I
I
I

If these

facts do not establish "private or special" legislation with-

and private.

I

I

The retroactive provision of Section 63-30a-3 clearly
offends Article VI, Section 26 of the Utah Constitution under
the facts of this case.
POINT IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILE'lG TO GRANT
THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S MOTIONS TO DISMISS.
The appellant incorporates herein the arguments
set forth above in support of POINT IV.
CONCLUSION
The lower court totally misconceived the law
applicable to the facts of this case in its desire to teach
the State of Utah a costly lesson and thereby chill the
functions of grand juries in this state.

First of all,

the lmver court \vas without jurisdiction to hear the case
inasmuch as the Board of Examiners of the State of Utah
has exclusive jurisdiction in such matters and the attempt
by the Legislature to circumvent such jurisdiction was
invalid.

Secondly, the evidence in this case does not

support an enforceable agreement by the respondent to
pay his attorneys more than $18,500 but even if it did
such an agreement would be invalid.

And last, the legis-

lation relied upon by the respondent is a retroactive intervention in the vested rights of the respondent and the
taxpayers of this state and constitutes private or special
legislation contrary to the organic law of this state.
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The judgment of the lower court should be reversed and the
case dismissed as prayed for by the appellant.
DATED this

23rJ

day of February, 1979.

Respectfully submitted,
ROB~R~ B. HANSEN
Attorney General of the State of Utah

JACK L. CRELLIN
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Appellant
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